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The Malpractice Liability of Company
Physicians
INTRODUCTION

Litigation involving the problem of the possible malpractice liability of
company physicians has always been characterized by the tension between
statutory interpretation on the one hand, and the policy considerations which
suffuse the law of workmen's compensation on the other.' Yet, constrained
always by statutory provision, the courts have, over time, developed a series of
tests which provide a framework for the analysis of the physician's relation
with his employer and, concomitantly, for a determination of the physician's
immunity or liability. The purposes of this Note are to present the tests whichthe courts have developed to determine the existence of the employment relationship with regard to company physicians, to examine the utility of these
tests in light of the policy considerations governing workmen's compensation
law, and finally to suggest a viable solution to the dilemma which increasingly confronts the courts in their attempts to resolve the problem. Before any
consideration of these court-made tests can be presented, however, it is first
necessary to examine the statutory context in which the problem of company
physician liability arises.
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISIONS AND THE CO-EMPLOYEE EXEMPTION

It is a fundamental premise of the law of workmen's compensation that
benefits for industrial injury will only be awarded when it can clearly be
shown that the injury occurred within the context of the employer-employee
relation. 2 In view of this requirement, it is perhaps not surprising that one of
the most vexing problems long confronting workmen's compensation law has
been that of determining which of the myriad working arrangements are en3
compassed by the employer-employee relation.
The scope of the employment relationship is, in the first instance, determined by the state legislature in the drafting of the workmen's compensation
statute. While the definitional sections of such statutes indicate which persons
'For recent examples of this tension see Proctor v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Oh. App. 2d 165,
289 N.E.2d 366 (1972), rev'd in part, 36 Ohio St.2d 3, 302 N.E.2d 580 (1973) (Judgment as to
appellant physicians reversed), and Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455
(1972).
2
A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.00 (rev. ed. 1972).
31t has been observed that "litigation aimed at delineating the scope of the employment
relationship in particular cases has produced more reported cases than any other status definition
in the history of modem law."
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are to be considered employers and which employees, the exclusive remedy
provisions, in turn, inform the potential employee-litigant that workmen's
compensation benefits will represent his sole remedy against his employer.
Nevertheless, the exclusive remedy provisions of all statutes are careful to protect the injured employee's common law rights against "third parties."'4 In this
connection, the employee-litigant will want to identify the third parties
against whom he may bring a common law action in the hope of recovering a
damage award greater than that provided by the workmen's compensation
statute. 5
The California Code provides an example of the limitations placed upon
the employee-litigant, "[w]here the conditions of compensation exist, the right
to recover such compensation . . . is, . . . the exclusive remedy for injury or
death of an employee against the employer or against any other employee of
the employer acting within the scope of his employment." The New York
Code similarly protects both employer and co-employee from a suit by the injured employee; "[t]he right to compensation or benefits under this chapter,
shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee, . . . when such employee is in7
jured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ."
8
In fact, most states now contain exclusive remedy provisions similar to those
in the California and New York statutes which bar suits against coemployees. 9
4

2A Id. § 71.00 (1976).

5

See generally, Davis, Workmen's Compensation-Usingan Enterprise Theory of Employ-

ment to Determine Who is a Third Party Tortfeasor, 32 U. PITT. L. REV. 289 (1971); Stevens,

The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MIcH. L. RF-v. 188 (1939); Note, Third Party Actions
Under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act, 26 ALA. L. REV. 701 (1974); Note,
Workmen's Compensation-Liability of a Fellow Servant as a Third Party for Negligence, 23
TENN. L. REV. 1084 (1955).

LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1977).
N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 29 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
$The following statutes bar co-employee suits in some manner: ALA. CODE § 25-5-53
(1972); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (Supp. 1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1022 (Supp. 1977); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-52-108 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-293(a) (1958). DEL. CODE tit. 19, § 2363 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103
(Supp. 1977); HAW. REv. STAT. § 386-8 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 72-209 (1973); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-36 (Bums Supp.
1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.20 (West Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 44-504(a) (Supp. 1977); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 342.690 (1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 152, § 15 (Law. Co-op 1976); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.827 (Supp. 1977);
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 92-204.1 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REv. STAT. § 616.560 (1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-4 (Supp. 1975); N.Y.
WORK. COMP. LAW § 29 (McKinney Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (Supp. 1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74.1 (Page 1973); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (West Supp. 1977); OR. REv. STAT. § 656.154 (1977); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 72 (Purdon Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (1977); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. tit.
130, art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §
OCAL.
7

65.1-103 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 51.24.010 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE §
23-2-6(a) (Supp. 1977); WYo. STAT. § 27-312(a) (Supp. 1975).
'Some typical examples of statutory co-employee exemption language include: "other than
a person in the same employ" (Delaware, Kansas, Michigan); "no employee of any employer"
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In light of the co-employee exemption aspects of most exclusive remedy
provisions, a considerable volume of recent workmen's compensation litigation
has been concerned with the questions of whether one causing an industrial
injury is an independent contractor or a co-employee of the injured worker
and whether the injured worker may maintain a common law tort action
against the person causing his injury. 1° These issues are perhaps most strikingly presented in the context of suits brought by an employee whose injury has
been exacerbated by the treatment of a company physician."
The initial issue in an action involving the malpractice liability of a fulltime, salaried company physician for the aggravation of an employee's compensable injury is one of statutory construction, the question being whether
the physician is or is not a co-employee within the meaning of the exclusive
remedy provision of the statute. 12 A company physician has been held an exempt co-employee under the New York statute,' 3 while a similarly situated
physician in California was adjudged and independent contractor, and
therefore susceptible to a malpractice action.' 4 Since the relevant statutes are
not markedly dissimilar, it is apparent that the resolution of the problem of
company physician liability seems to involve considerations in addition to
those of statutory construction. The problem is further obfuscated by the
often informal, quasi-employment status which some physicians enjoy with
the company for whom they provide medical services.
In initially responding to this multi-faceted problem of company physician

(Ohio); "those conducting his [the employer's] business" (North Carolina); "acting in furtherance
of the employer's business" (West Virginia); "performing the duties of employment" (Montana).
See relevant statutory citations, supra note 8.
"See generally, Marks, Klein & Long, Co-Employee Suits Under Workmen's Compensation,
26 INs. COUNC. Q. 327 (1976); McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study
of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 Tax. L. Rav. 389 (1959); Comment,
Employee or Independent Contractor: The Need for a Reassessment of the Standard Used Under
California's Workmen's Compensation, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 133 (1975); Comment, The Test of the
Employment Relationship Under Workmen's Compensation, 1 U.C.L.A.-ALAS. L. Rxv. 40

(1971).
"Compare DeHaven v. Caulfield, 114 App. D.C. 264, 314 F.2d 269 (1963), with Hayes v.
Marshall Field & Co., 351 Ill. App. 329, 115 N.E.2d 99 (1953).
"Judicial consideration of the exemption of company physicians as co-employees has been
delayed by the fact that many of the early workmen's compensation statutes did not contain coemployee exemption provisions, and because the courts have been concerned with such collateral
issues as the possible bar to a malpractice action because of preliminary receipt of benefits under
the act, and the related issue of the possibility of double recovery via the act and the malpracticing physician. For the leading cases involving these issues see Bryant v. Dougherty, 267 N.C. 545,
148 S.E.2d 548 (1966); Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga. App. 78, 84 S.E.2d 847 (1954); Fauver v. Bell,
192 Va. 518, 65 S.E.2d 575 (1951); Mitchell v. Peaslee, 143 Me. 372, 63 A.2d 302 (1951); Hancock v. Halliday, 65 Idaho 645, 150 P.2d 137 (1944). These issues rarely arise today because of
the subrogation and election of remedy provisions of most compensation statutes. See, e.g,, Jones
v. Laird Foundation, Inc., 195 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1973).
"Garcia v. Iserson, 42 App. Div. 2d 776, P46 N.Y.S.2d 572, affd, 33 N.Y.2d 421, 353
N.Y.S.2d 955, 309 N.E.2d 420 (1974).
"'Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1972).
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liability, courts have sometimes turned to the common law of master and servant and the resultant "right to control" test.
COMMON LAW ORIGINS: THE "RIGHT TO CONTROL" TEST

In the early part of this century, when the first workmen's compensation
statutes were drafted in the United States, the legislators relied heavily on
common law principles in delineating the parameters of the employment relation.1 5 Similarly, in their early interpretations of workmen's compensation
statutes, the courts equated the employer-employee relation with the common
law of master and servant.16 Indeed, some states, in defining "employer" and
"employee," use these common law definitions.1 7 In supplying workable
definitions of master and servant the common law also provided a comprehensive set of criteria for the purpose of determining whether one acting
for another was a servant or an independent contractor.' These criteria, in
one form or another, have invariably been used in litigation where the
employment rleation is at issue. 19
It has generally been agreed that one's right to control the conduct of
another in his labors is the dispositive criterion in establishing the masterservant relationship; 20 indeed, the master's right to control has been regarded
"5Malone, Some Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's Compensation,
L. REv. 1039, 1042-43 (1963).
8
' REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2)(3), Comment d (1957).
7
1See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 21, 22 (Purdon Supp. 1977); Tex. Cir. Code Ann. tit.
130, art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1977).
16

VAND.

"$RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) provides:

In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct operation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
"Comment, Employee or Independent Contractor: The Need for a Reassessment of the
Standard Used Under Caifornia's Workmen's Compensation, 10 U.S.F. L. Rev. 133 (1975). For
use of the RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) criteria with slight variation see McKissic

v. Bondine, 42 Mich. App. 203, 208-09, 201 N.W.2d 333, 335-36 (1972); Empire Star Mines Co.
v. California Employment Comm'n., 28 Cal.2d 33, 43, 168 P.2d 686, 692 (1946).
"°The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2)(3) (1957), defines "servant" and "independent contractor" in terms of the master's right to control. See also, IA A. LARSON supra § note
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as the sine qua non of the doctrine of respondeat superior.2 Thus, when an
injured employee has brought a "third party suit," against a person who is
arguably a co-employee within the meaning of the exclusive remedy provision
of the workmen's compensation statute, the courts have employed the c~ritrol
test for the purpose of determining whether the employment relation exists
between the employer and the "co-employee. '22 If the person causing the injury is found, through application of the control test, to be a co-employee of
the injured worker, then he is immune from a common law action; if he is
found to be an independent contractor, he is susceptible to such an action.
The right to control test has been similarly employed in suits wherein an
employee's compensable injury has been aggravated by a physician who is
arguably a co-employee. 23 In Hoffman v. Houston Clinic, 24 the plaintiffemployee's injury was exacerbated by a physician retained by the employer.25
Under the Texas workmen's compensation act the injured employee could not
maintain a common law action against the employer or "any agent, servant
or employee of said employer for damages for personal injury." 26 The trial

court held for the defendant, based on the contention that the defendant was
an "agent, servant or employee" of the employer. 27 The appellate court
reversed, however, holding that "a doctor employed to make an examination
of a third person is . . . distinctively free from control or direction of his
' z8
employer and is not a mere servant.
Although the Hoffman court did not consider the details of the physicianemployer relationship in applying the control test, the Texas Supreme Court
2, 43.30 (1973); Note, Workmen's Compensation-Employee or Independent Contractor-The
Right to Control and the Requirement of Payment of Wages, 22 MERCER L. REv. 497 (1971);
Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Immunity of a Physicianfrom Tort Action for Aggravation of Compensable Injuries, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 519 (1976). The control test was used in the
following cases involving the medical treatment of industrial injury: Lemonovich v. Klimoski, 315
F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Lazar v. Falor, 118 Pitt. Legal J. 299, 303 (C.P.
Allegheny Cty. May 11, 1970); McKelvey v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex. 1964); Howard v.
Berg, 86 Pa. Dist. & Co. 358, 362-63 (C.P. 1953); Hoffman v. Houston Clinic, 41 S.W.2d 134,
139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Metzger v. Western Maryland Ry., 30 F.2d 50, 51 (4th Cir. 1929) (in
each case physician held to be an independent contractor); Jones v. Bouza, 7 Mich. App. 561,
152 N.W.2d 393, 395 (1967), affd, 381 Mich. 299, 160 N.W.2d 81 (1968); Mrachek v. Sunshine
Biscuit, 308 N.Y. 116 (1954) (control test used to protect physicians from liability).
21Malone, Some Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's Compensation,
16 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1042-43 (1963); Miller, Suits Against Fellow Employees Under the
Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 321, 334 (1977); Comment, The
Test for the Employment Relations Under Workmen's Compensation, 1 U.C.L.A.-ALAS. L. REV.
40 (1971).
2'The volume of cases involving a determination of the employment relationship for coemployee exemption purposes is great. For such cases dealing specifically with a physician's possible immunity as a co-employee see note 20 supra.
2sSee note 20 supra; 28 A.L.R.3d 1066, § 5 (1969); 101 C.J.S. § 1043(2) (1958); 61 Am.Jur.2d § 220 (1972).
2441 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
21Id. at 138.
26id. at 134.
"rrx. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 130, art. 8306, sec. 3 (Vernon 1977).
2841 S.W.2d 134, 139.
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closely examined this relationship over thirty years later" in the case of
McKelvey v. Barber.30 There, the defendant Barber was clearly the
employer's company doctor.31 Yet the court found that only about fifteen or
twenty percent of the doctor's work was of an industrial nature, that he was
not on a retainer with the employer, but was paid for his services as they were
rendered, and that he also engaged in the general practice of medicine.3 2 On
the basis of these findings, the court concluded that as between the physician
and the employer, the employer did not have the "right to control the
physical details as to the manner of performance which is characteristic of the
relationship of master and servant; 33 the physician was an independent contractor and therefore susceptible to individual liability. 3 ' While the McKelvey
court saw the common law relationship of master and servant as dispositive
on the issue of the existence of the employment relation,35 it also indicated
that in the "ordinary case" the physician and the employer do not contemplate that the relationship of master and servant will arise between them.
"The doctor is generally expected to exercise and rely entirely upon his own
professional knowledge and skill without interference from . . . the employer.
"36

It must be stressed that the use of the law of master and servant and the
right to control test by the Texas courts is not idiosyncratic; in two Pennsylvania cases these concepts were applied and results were achieved similar to
those in Hoffman and McKelvey. 37 In Lemonovich v. Klimoski,3 8 the federal
district court noted that because of provisions in the Pennsylvania workmen's
compensation act, where "employer" and "employee" are respectively equated
with "master" and "servant, '3 9 the "particular criterion which distinguishes an
29Between Hoffman and McKelvey the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an

employee's malpractice suit against a physician retained by the employer's insurance carrier was
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas compensation act. This case, however, is
not instructive on the question of company physician liability, since plaintiff made the pleading
mistake of alleging that the physician acted "under the direction and control of the company;" in
suing both the physician and the insurance carrier he effectively foreclosed his suit against the
physician. Martin v. Consolidated Casualty Insurance Co., 138 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1945).
S0381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1964).
31id. at 63. The physician's title is in no way dispositive of the issue of the existence of the
employment relationship. See Lemonovich v. Klimoski, 315 F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (W.D. Pa.
1970); Lazar v. Falor, 118 Prrr. LEGAL J. 299, 303 (C.P. Allegheny Cty. May 11, 1970).
3381 S.W.2d 59, 63.
311d.

34

at 62.

Id. The court stated in this connection that "an agent, servant or employee within the
meaning of this statute is ordinarily one for whose conduct the employer would, aside from the
Workmen's Compensation Act, be legally responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior."
Id. at 62.
31d. at 63.
35
ld.
Lemonovich v. Klimoski, 315 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Lazar v. Falor, 118 Pitt.
Legal J. 299 (C.P. Allegheny Cty. May 11, 1970).
3515 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
39
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 §§ 21, 22 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
5
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employer-employee relationship from an independent contractor relationship
is the right to control the means of accomplishing the result." 40 In applying
this law to the case at bar, where the injured employee had sued his
employer's "surgical liaison officer" for aggravation of his industrial injury,
the court found that the employer had no right of control over the means by
which the physician did his work, 41 and therefore that the physician was not
an exempt co-employee within the meaning of the act. 42 The emphasis of the
Lemonotich court on the details of the physician-employer relationship 4 is
well-placed, for those details are undoubtedly the best manifestation of the
master's right to control his servant's activities. The limited utility of the test,
however, is apparent in the case where the physician-employer relationship is
close.
In Lazar v. Falor,44 the physician was employed full time in the
employer's medical department; his hours were fixed by the employer; he was
paid a monthly salary; and, his office, facilities, and equipment were provided by the employer. Moreover, while it was clear that the physician could
provide only such medical services as were authorized by the employer, he
was neither allowed to engage in any private practice, nor was he permitted
to receive any fees additional to his salary. 4" Since it would be difficult to imagine a relationship between physician and employer closer than that
presented by these facts, the Lazar court's holding that the physician was an
47
6
independent contractor,' and therefore susceptible to a malpractice action,
might be regarded as a finding that company physicians are susceptible to
48
such actions as a matter of law.
If the control test requires that the employer have the right to control the
details or the manner of the physician's work, it is apparent that the physician can never be characterized as a servant, and, by extension, an exempt
40315 F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
41Id. at 1292.
The facts of the employment relation reveal that the physician was paid on a prevailing
fee-for-service basis, that his duties included caring for all of the employer's injured employees
who were hospitalized, referring some employee-patients to certain surgeons, keeping appropriate
records and reporting to the employer on all medical treatment, and being available in the event
of any emergency at any of the employer's mine portals. See id.
42See Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, PA. CONS. ANN. tit. 77 § 72 (Purdon
Supp. 1977) (exclusive remedy provision).
"3See note 41 supra.
44118 Pitt. Legal J. 299 (C.P. Allegheny Cty. May 11, 1970).
"Id. at 500. Compare the details of this physician-employer relationship with the
RESTATEMENT'S criteria, developed for the purpose of proving the existence of the master-servant
relationship, quoted in note 18 supra.
"1The court defined "independent contractor" as "a person engaged in the work . . . [having] the exclusive control of the manner of performing it, being responsible only for the result."
118 PIT. LEGAL J. 299. 303 (C.P. Allegheny Cry. May 11, 1970).

"?id.

"For a similar view of the physician's susceptibility to a common law tort action, despite a
close relationship with the employer, see, Metzger v. Western Maryland Ry., 30 F.2d 50 (4th Cir.
1929).
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In this regard, one court has stressed that if employers are so

presumptuous as to attempt to
direct . . . [their physicians] as to the method of treatment of . .. [an] injured

man, and this method was regarded by... [the physicians] as unwise, they would
• . . [be] bound to exercise their own superior skill and better judgment and to
disobey their employers, if in their opinion the welfare of the patient required it.A'
In reacting to the strictures of the common law control test, some courts
have so modified the test as to allow for the immunity of the physician as a
co-employee. 5 ' Rather than emphasize the employer's control over the manner or details of the physician's work, these courts have applied the control
test in a much narrower fashion. Under this analysis, such questions as
whether the physician has a private practice in addition to his work for the
company; 52 whether he is paid by salary or on a prevailing fee-for-service
basis; 5" whether he works full time for the employer; 54 and whether he works
in the same plant or establishment as the employer and employees" are considered as evidence of the employer's right to "control" the physician.
Other attempts to circumvent the control test have come in the form of
newly developed tests, designed either to augment or supplant the common
law considerations of master and servant.56 The conclusion that the physician,
4
91n

Jones v. Bouza, 7 Mich. App. 561, 152 N.W.2d 393, 395 (1967), affd, 381 Mich. 299,
160 N.W.2d 881 (1968), the court observed that the employer cannot possibly "directly control
his [the physician's] every action in the performance of his professional expertise."
5
OMetzger v. Western Maryland Ry., 30 F.2d 50, 51 (4th Cir. 1929).
5
The details of the physician-employer relationship in Jones v. Bouza were nearly identical
to those in Lazar v. Falor, yet the.ones court found the physician immune. See also Mrachek v.
Sunshine Biscuit, 308 N.Y. 116, 121-122 (1954).
"The existence of the physician's private practice has been a factor in the following cases:
Garcia v. Iserson, 42 App. Div. 2d 776, 346 N.Y.S.2d 572, affd, 33 N.Y.2d 421, 553 N.Y.S.2d
955, 309 N.E.2d 420 (1974); Golini v. Nachtigall, 75 Misc. 2d 523, 347 N.Y.S.2d 981, affd, 46
A.D.2d 628, 359 N.Y.S.2d 879, affd, 38 N.Y.2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 45, 343 N.E.2d 762 (1973);
Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1972); Lazar v. Falor, 118 Pitt.
Legal J. 299 (C.P. Allgehney Cty. May 11, 1970); Jones v. Bouza, 7 Mich. App. 561, 152
N.W.2d 393 (1967), affd, 381 Mich. 299, 160 N.W.2d 881 (1968); Bryant v. Dougherty, 627
N.C. 545, 148 S.E.2d 548 (1966); McKelvey v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1964); Garrison v.
Graybeel, 202 Tenn. 567, 308 S.W.2d 375 (1957).
5See, e.g., Garcia v. Iserson, 33 N.Y.2d 423; Golini v. Nachtigall, 75 Misc.2d 523-24; Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 658; Lemonovich v. Klimoski, 315 F. Supp. 1292; Lazar v.
Falor, 118 Pitt. Legal 3. 300; Bergen v. Miller, 104 N.J. Super. 350, 352 (1969); Jones v. Bouza,
152 N.W.2d 393, 395; McKelvey v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d at 63; Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, 308
N.Y. 116, 121 (1954).
"See, e.g., Proctor v. Ford Motor Co., 36 Ohio St. 2d 3, 4-5. 302 N.E.2d 580, 581 (1973);
Golini v. Nachtigall, 75 Misc. 2d at 524; Bergen v. Miller, 104 N.J. Super. at 352; Jones v.
Bouza, 152 N.W.2d at 395. But see, Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 658; Lazar v. Falor,
118 Pitt. Legal J. at 300.
5See, e.g., Garcia v. Iserson, 33 N.Y.2d at 423; Golini v. Nachtigall, 75 Misc.2d at 524.
But see, Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 658; Lazar v. Falor, 118 Pitt. Legal J. at 300.
See also Proctor v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Oh. App. 2d 165, 171, 289 N.E.2d 366, 371 (1972),
reu'd, 36 Ohio St. 2d 3, 302 N.E.2d 580 (1973).
"For criticisms of the right to control test, and the development of alternative theories see
generally, 1A A. LARSON §§ 43.30, 43.40, 44.00, 45.10 (proposing use of the "relative nature of

1978]

MALPRACTICE LIABILITY

in treating an injured employee, is not "engaged in the business pursuit of the
employer," 57 has been used to characterize him as an independent contractor.
Closely related is the argument that the physician's aggravation of the
employee's injury was not an injury received in the course of the employee's
employment, s8 so that the workmen's compensation statute is inapplicable,
and the plaintiff-employee may bring a tort action against the physician. 9 It
has also been suggested that the doctrine of proximate cause could be used to
demonstrate either the company physician's susceptibility to, or immunity
from, a common law action. 60 Finally, quite apart from analyses of the common law of master and servant, examinations have been made of legislative
intent to determine whether or not company physicians should be held liable
within the meaning of the co-employee exemption provision of the statute.6"
These various attempts to circumvent the common law restrictions reflect
a judicial discomfort with the control test; the concept has been made so
malleable by judicial interpretation 62 that its utility has been severly impaired.6 3 This discomfort is most apparent in California, where emphasis on
the physician as a professional has resulted in the development of the dual
capacity doctrine.
THE COMPANY PHYSICIAN AS A PROFESSIONAL:
THE DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE

Among the various exceptions, modifications and evasions of the right to
the work" test); Comment, Employee or Independent Contractor: The Need for a Reassessment
of the Standard Used Under California Workmen's Compensation, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 133, 141
(1975); Comment, The Test for the Employment Relation Under Workmen's Compensation, 1
U.C.L.A.-ALAS. L. REv. 40, 55 (1971); Comment, The Employment Relation in Workmen's
and Employer's Liability Regulation, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 161, 172 (1962).
Compensation
5
See, e.g., Howard v. Berg, 86 Pa. Dist. & Co. 358, 362-63 (C.P. 1953). See also, Fauver
v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 527, 65 S.E.2d 575, 580 (1954); Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga. App. 78, 81, 84
S.E.2d 847, 849-50 (1954). But see, Proctor v. Ford Motor Co., 36 Ohio St. 2d 3, 5, 302 N.E.2d
580, 582 (1973); Golini v. Nachtigall, 75 Misc.2d 523, 524, 347 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982-831, affd, 46
A.D.2d 628, 359 N.Y.S.2d 879, affd, 38 N.Y.2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 45, 343 N.E.2d 762 (1973).
"The argument is based on the fundamental workmen's compensation requirement that
only those injuries are compensable which arise out of, and in the course of, the employee's
employment. 1 A. Larson, supra note 2 § 6.10 (1972).
"This argument was advanced in the Appellate Division dissent in Golini v. Nachtigall, 46
A.D.2d 628, 629, 359 N.Y.S.2d 879, 871-80 (1973). See also, Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App.
3d 655, 660-61, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455, 458-59 (1972); Lazar v. Falor, 118 Pitt. Legal J. 299, 305
(C.P. Allegany Cty. Pa., May 11, 1970) (No official report). See generally, Leidy, Malpractice
Actions and Compensation Acts, 29 MICH. L. Rav. 568 (1931).
60The use of the proximate cause doctrine for these purposes in a state without a coemployee exemption provision has been suggested in Wilson v. Hungate, 434 S.W.2d 580, 583
(Mo. 1968). See generally, Leidy, Malpractice Actions and Compensation Acts, 29 MICH. L.
Rav. 568, 572 (1931); 14 ARK. L. REv. 117 (1959-60); 17 IowA L. REv. 103 (1931).
O1See, Golini v. Nachtigall, 75 Misc. 2d 523,525, 347 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982-83; Lazar v. Falor,

118 Pitt. L.J. 299, 306; Bergen v. Miller, 104 N.J. Super. 350, 352; Hancock v. Halliday, 65
Idaho 645,665, 150 P.2d 137,144 (1944). See also, the appellate court opinion in, Proctor v.
Ford Motor Co., 32 Oh. App. 2d 165, 173-74, 289 N.E.2d 366, 370-72 (1972), rev'd, 36 Ohio St.
2d 3, 302 N.E.2d 580 (1973).
6
2See
3

text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
"See note 54 supra.
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control test, the dual capacity doctrine stands unique, for it acknowledges
that a full-time, salaried company physician may logically be considered an
exempt co-employee under the exclusive remedy provisions of most state
workmen's compensation statutes."1 Yet the doctrine regards the physician as
having two working personalities; he acts not only as a co-employee of the injured laborer, but also as an independent, professional physician, susceptible
6
to individual liability. "
It is fairly obvious that the development of the dual capacity doctrine
reflects the strong judicial sentiment that any employment relationship that
the physician has with the employer is subordinate to the patient-physician
relationship. 6 The primacy of this relationship was emphasized in Gay v.
Greene:
It is alleged that the defendant was "employed," but as a physician he would be
charged with exercising his own judgment in determining the manner and method
of treating an injury. The National Lead Company [the employer] was not engaged in the practice of medicine; rather, the defendant physician was engaged in his
own profession as an independent contractor. His liability arisesfrom the doctorpatient relationship with the plaintff, and not from the employer-employee relationship. 7

The dual capacity doctrine was first used in the context of company
physician liability in the case of Duprey v. Shane.6 8 There, the employee, a
practical nurse, was treated by her employer and a co-employee, both chiropractors, for an injury she received during the course of her employment.
Although the California workmen's compensation act did not at that time
contain a co-employee exemption provision,6 9 employers were protected from
common law actions. 70 Nevertheless, the court regarded the chiropractor142A A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 72.61, 72.80 (1976).
65

See, e.g., 2A A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 72.80 (1976); Kelly, Workmen's Compensation
and Employee Sueability: The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974); Miller,
Suits Against Fellow Employees Under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, 45
U.M.K.C.L. REv. 321 (1977); 1 OHIo N. L. Rav. 544 (1974).
6
Judicial recognition of the dominance of the physician-patient relation has been expressed
by the appellate court in, Proctor v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Oh. App. 2d 165, 173, 289 N.E.2d 366,
372 (1972), rev'd, 36 Ohio St. 2d 3, 302 N.E.2d 580 (1973); and in, Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 665, 661 99 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459 (1972); McKelvey v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59, 63 (Tex.
1964); Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga. App. 78, 81, 84 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1954); Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal.
2d 781, 793, 249 P.2d 8, 15 (1952); Ciotti v. Jarecki Manufacturing Co., 128 Pa. Super. 233,
238-39 (1937); Metzger v. Western Maryland Ry., 30 F.2d 50, 51 (1929); But see, Bergen v.
Miller, 104 NJ. Super. 350, 353 (1969), where the court concluded that "the immunity [provided
by the co-employee exemption provision] applies to a fellow-employee even if he is in a supervisory capacity or uniquely talented as in the case of a plant physician." Id.
679 1 Ga. App. 78, 81, 84 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1954) (emphasis added).
6839 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
69
See, 2A A. LARSON. supra note 2, § 72.61 (1976). California has since amended its statute
to bar7 0co-employee suits; see text accompanying note 6 supra.
Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 790, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (1952).
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employer as "a person other than the employer"' within the meaning of the
compensation act: "In treating the injury Dr. Shane did not do so because of
the employer-employee relationship, but did so as an attending doctor, and
his relationship to . ..[the plaintiff] was that of doctor and patient."7 2 The
Duprey court similarly held the co-employee-physician liable, as it did the
employer, thus anticipating company physician liability under the amended
act which later protected co-employees. 73 The Duprey case received extensive
consideration and was accepted in toto in Hoffman v. Rogers,74 where the
issue of company physician liability was again adjudicated. In Hoffman, the
defendant-physician was a full-time, salaried company doctor.75 The California court, in holding the physician susceptible to a common law tort action, observed that although Duprey was decided prior to the passage of the
co-employee exemption provision in California, there was "nothing in the
amendment to undermine the dual personality theory."76
Although the Duprey and Hoffman cases clearly indicate that in California" company physicians are susceptible to individual liability via the dual
capacity doctrine regardless of the extent of the physician's affinity with the
employer, the doctrine has been treated unevenly in other jurisdictions. 78 In
Pennsylvania, where there has been a tacit acceptance of the doctrine, 79 emphasis has been placed on the inconsistency of holding liable an independent
physician to whom industrial cases are referred, while immunizing a company
physician who provides similar services; it seems incongruous to exempt the
company physician merely because of the fortuity of the employment relationship.80 The anomaly of protecting company physicians, while holding liable
independent physicians providing identical industrial services would appear to
"Id. at 790; 249 P.2d at 15.
72Id.

at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.

731d. at 794, 249 P.2d at 16.

Cal. App. 3d 655, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1972).
"The physician's relation with his employer is detailed at 22 Cal. App. 3d 658, 99 Cal.
Rptr. at 457.
"6Id. at 662, Cal. Rptr. at 460.
"For California cases defining the parameters of the dual capacity doctrine in other
employment contexts see, e.g., Douglas v. E & J Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 105, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 797 (1977); Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 7 Cal. 3d 616, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 498
P.2d 1063 (1972).
"Compare Lazar v. Falor, 118 Pitt. Legal J. 299, 303 (C.P. Allegheny Cty. 1970) (doctrine
implicitly accepted), with Proctor v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Oh. App. 2d 165, 174, 289 N.E.2d 366,
372 (1972), rev'd, 36 Ohio St. 2d 3,302 N.E.2d 580 (1973) (doctrine rejected on reversal).
79
Lazar v. Falor, 118 Pitt. Legal J. 299, 303 (C.P. Allegheny Cty., May 11, 1970).
80In Lazar, the court observed,
We do not believe . . .that the Legislature intended that the rights of an employee
vis-a-vis a physician who is a "full time employee" of the employer were to be any different from the rights of an employee treated by a physician "furnished" by the
employer who conducts his practice on his own premises and by the use of his own
equipment.
Id. at 306. Contra, Jones v. Bouza, 7 Mich. App. 561, 152 N.W.2d 393, 395 (1967), affd, 381
Mich. 299, 160 N.W.2d 881 (1968).
7422
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be present in all those states which both protect the company physician and
allow the injured employee to elect to receive treatment from either company
or private doctors.81
The general view of the doctor as independent professional and its
theoretical concomitant, the dual capacity doctrine, manifests a judicial
disinclination to limit the recovery of employees whose injuries have been exacerbated by medical malpractice. The doctrine also reveals, to some extent,
the discomfort of the courts with the result of immunizing a negligent physician solely because of his employment status. Such attitudes suggest that the
problem of company physician immunity or liability is pre-eminently one of
policy. Indeed, the viability of the various approaches to this problem cannot
be fully determined until an examination has been made of the central policy
considerations which underlie the law of workmen's compensation.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE MALPRACTICE
OF COMPANY PHYSICIANS

Workmen's compensation is fundamentally a type of income insurance.
On the basis of small, scheduled contributions made by the employer,
employee, or both, the employee is entitled to receive a portion of his income, as well as medical expenses, 8 2 when the flow of that income is interrupted by industrial injury.83 This arrangement is made possible by an
employer-employee quid pro quo: The worker gives up his right to bring a
common law action for damages and the employer acknowledges liability,
while relinquishing his right to certain common law defenses.8 4 According to
one authority,
[tihis reasoning can be extended to the tortfeasor co-employee; he, too, is involved in this compromise of rights. Perhaps ....
one of the things he is entitled to expect in return for what he has given up is freedom from commonlaw suits based on industrial accidents in which he is at fault.85
Others, however, have questioned the wisdom of the co-employee exemp"1For a compilation of statutory choice of physician provisions see, Russell, Schramm,
Three Issues in Compensation Medical Care, in II SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, 318-19 (1973).
2
A. Larson, Basic Concepts and Objectives of Workmen's Compensation, in I SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, 31, 35

(1973).
"I1d. at 31-32.
"Marks, Klein & Long, Co-employee Suits Under Workmen's Compensation, 26 FED'N OF
INS. COUN. Q. 327, 328 (1976). The common law defenses include contributory negligence,
assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant doctrine. See also, E. F. CHEIT, INJURY AND
RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 12 (1961); Comment, The Employment Relation in
Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability Regulation, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 161 (1962).
812A A. LARSON supra note 2 § 72.20 (1976). See also, Miller, Suits Against Fellow
Employees Under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 321, 328
(1977).
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tion provision; co-employee immunity has been seen as shifting the burden of
the injury to the injured employee," and generally producing unfair results 7
in the sense that the employee is both deprived of the opportunity to sue the
co-worker tortfeasor and is compelled to rely on a statutory schedule of
benefits which is often regarded as inadequate. Immunity provisions have also
been thought to encourage careless conduct 8 in that the industrial worker,
safe in the knowledge that a negligence suit may not be brought against him,
will be less assiduous in his adherence to safety standards. Yet, co-employee
immunity does undoubtedly minimize industrial discord and ensure recovery
for the injured employee, since it seems likely that few common law tort
judgments against co-employees would be satisfied.89
It is significant that these justifications for co-employee immunity are not
clearly applicable to company physicians. As a "non-laborer" the company
physician does not participate in the employer-employee quid pro quo; since
it is extremely unlikely that a physician would ever be injured by a fellow
employee, he realistically gives up no right to bring suit in return for his own
immunity from suit. Similarly, as a non-laborer, the company physician does
not readily figure in problems of industrial discord. Finally, although
judgments against negligent co-employee laborers would no doubt rarely be
satisfied, the physician, as a highly salaried individual, or as an insured professional, would more likely be able to pay the price of his negligence.
Moreover, while it is true that the general arguments concerning the coemployee exemption are inapplicable to the company physician, any analysis
of physician immunity must include a consideration of other factors. The
"public policy disapproving malpractice" must be balanced against the need
for ready, efficient treatment of industrial injury,90 and the desirability of
economical risk distribution.91 In addition, there has long been a fear that
protection of company physicians would encourage careless treatment.9 2 Also,
"Miller, supra note 85, at 337.
872A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 72.50 (1976). See also note, The Third Party ActionExpanding the Circle of Immunity: Coemployees, 48 Miss. L.J. 87 (1977).
$'Marks, Klein & Long, Co-Employee Suits Under Workmen's Compensation, 26 FED'N OF
INS. COUNCIL Q. 327, 331 (1976).
89Id.; Note, The Third PartyAction-Expanding the Circle of Immunity: Coemployees, 48
Miss. LJ. 87, 109 (1977).
9'Proctor v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Ohio App. 2d 165, 174-75 289 N.E.2d 366, 372 (1972),
rev'd, 36 Ohio St. 2d 3, 5-6, 302 N.E.2d 580, 582 (1973).
"Comment, The Employment Relation in Workmen's Compensation and Employer's
Liability Legislation, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 161, 167 (1962).
'2This concern was expressed in Smith v. Golden State Hosp., 111 Cal. App. 667, 672, 296
P.2d 127, 129 (Cal. 1931):
That independent professions by the fact of business contact with the employer would
be absolved of responsibility for mistake .... in secondary affliction, seems obnoxious
to the purpose and spirit of ... the statute. To so hold might induce quackery, and
place a premium upon negligence, inefficiency, and wanton disregard of the professional obligations of medical departments of industry, toward the artisan.
Accord: Hoffinan v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 661, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459 (1972); Hancock
v. Halliday, 65 Idaho 645, 652, 150 P.2d 137, 146 (1944).
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the general judicial reluctance to replace common law rights with statutory
3
remedies has invariably entered into analyses of company physician liability.
While the merits of co-employee immunity are at least arguable, there
can be little doubt about the rationale behind holding independent contractors susceptible to common law tort actions-as separate economic entities
they have a presumed capacity to distribute and provide for their own risks. 9'
This suggests that the company physician who treats non-industrial patients
may be characterized as an independent contractor, for he must obviously
possess some means of personal risk distribution as to those patients.
Co-employee immunity would not be a problem-indeed, it would not be
a topic of serious discussion-were it not true that workmen's compensation
benefits are usually inadequate:
[B]ecause of fixed dollar ceilings on benefits, compensation awards are
generally inadequate, both in relation to meeting the needs of the victims of
industrial injury under current cost of living levels, and conspicuously in relation to standards that have grown up of what constitutes adequate damages
in a personal injury action.95
As a form of income insurance, workmen's compensation is primarily designed to ensure against loss of earnings; it does not compensate for pain and suffering, disfigurement,9" or for physical losses that are unaccompanied by loss
of earnings.9 7
If workmen's compensation benefits are inadequate in the typical industrial accident case, this inadequacy is even more apparent in those cases
where the injury has been aggravated by medical malpractice. 9 8 Even though
workmen's compensation benefits cover aggravation of the injury by malpracticing physicians,9 9 the chances of collateral damages occurring in this situa112A A. LARSON supra note 2 § 72.50 (1976): "If there is no strong reason of compensation
policy for destroying common-law rights as to various classes of third parties, then, every
presumption should be on the side of preserving those rights, once basic protection has been
assured." Id.
"W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 71 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, The Test
for the Employment Relationship Under Workmen's Compensation, 1 U.C.L.A.-ALAS. L. Rav.
40, 49 (1971).
95
2A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 72.50 (1976).
"Note, Malpractice Actions and Workmen's Compensation, 36 VA. L. REv. 781, 786
(1950);7 4 FORDHAM L. REv. 358, 360 (1935).
2 A. Larson, Basic Concepts and Objectives of Workmen's Compensation, in I SuPPL..mN.
TAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, 33
(1973). See also, Martindale, Third Party Actions Against Co-Employees, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv.
297, 297 (1960).
"In Hancock v. Halliday, 65 Idaho 645, 650, 150 P.2d 137, 140 (1944), the court observed
that the immunity of the physician would "permit the wrongdoer to go practically unscathed for
grievous damage to another, and would likewise sentence the workman to a lifetime of drear and
hopeless existence through inability to work ....
with his only compensation limited to a sum
totally inadequate to cover his substantial losses."
991 A. LARSON, supra note 2 § 13.21 (1972), 2A Id. § 72.61 (1976).
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tion are greater, and therefore the likelihood that the benefits will prove inadequate is correspondingly higher. This deficiency is particularly apparent
in the context of damages for pain and suffering and disfigurement; the injured employee whose uncompensated pain and suffering is compounded by
the negligent treatment of a physician is clearly deserving of an opportunity
for recovery additional to that provided by the act.
These manifold policy considerations which govern the triangular relationship between physician, employer, and employee001 may be distilled into
three general categories: the desirability of rapid and expert treatment of industrial injury; the need for the injured worker to be made whole; 10 ' and the
relative abilities of the three to serve as efficient conduits for risk distribution.
Although the common law tests have been made so flexible by the courts as
to produce any result desired, 102 the master's right to control his servant, the
control test, is in no way directly responsive to the above considerations.
Alternatively, a judicial application of the dual capacity doctrine is tantamount to a decision that company physicians are susceptible to individual
liability as a matter of law, regardless of the scope of the statutory co03
employee exemption provision.
The dual capacity doctrine does, however, afford the injured laborer an
opportunity for full recovery. In this regard that application of the doctrine
does not influence the merits of the employee's action; it is merely a
mechanism which provides the injured employee the opportunity to prove
that his injury has been exacerbated by the physician's negligence and that
benefits awarded pursuant to the workmen's compensation act are inadequate. As for risk distribution, the doctrine leaves this determination not to
the courts, but to the physician and the employer; if the physician has nonindustrial patients he must obviously contrive some method of personal risk
distribution as to those patients. If, however, the physician treats only industrial patients, the employer will probably either undertake to pay the
physician's malpractice insurance premiums, or agree himself to compensate
workers whose injuries have been aggravated by the physician's malpractice.
Either way, the employer serves as risk distributor. In fact, this is the most
desirable arrangement since most employers who can afford to retain a physician can also absorb the cost of malpractice much more easily than the individual physician.

' 0 A quadrangular relationship might be created by adding the insurer. For an analysis of
the complex issues surrounding the insurer's role in the problem of co-employee liability see,
Marks, Klein & Long, Co-Employee Suits Under Workmen's Compensation, 26 FEDN OF INS.
COUNCIL.
1

Q. 327 (1976).

' 0See text accompanying note 95 supra.
'"Compare Jones v. Bouza, 7 Mich. App. 561, 152 N.W.2d 393 (1967), affd, 381 Mich.

299, 160 N.W.2d 881 (1968), with Lemonovich v. Klimoski, 315 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
See also, text accompanying note 50 supra.
"'sSee text accompanying notes 76, 80 supra.
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CONCLUSION

In confronting the problem of company physician liability, the California
lead in adopting the dual capacity doctrine should be followed. Since the
doctrine states that physicians are vulnerable to a malpractice action as a
matter of law, regardless of the statutory co-employee exemption provision, it
may be more effective if state legislatures would incorporate the doctrine into
their workmen's compensation acts, rather than allow for its eventual adoption by the courts. Inclusion of a statement in the act that physicians are not
to be considered co-employees or fellow employees would undoubtedly prevent much litigation on the issue of whether company physicians are susceptible to individual liability. As adopted by either the legislatures or. the courts
the doctrine will allow the physician and the employer to decide who may
best serve as risk distributor, a decision which will, perhaps, turn largely on
whether, and the extent to which, the company physician treats non-industrial
patients. Moreover, the doctrine will afford the injured worker at least an opportunity for full recovery. More importantly, in creating this opportunity for
the worker, the dual capacity doctrine will highlight the fundamental
recognition that company physician immunity is inconsistent with the policy
considerations upon which the law of workmen's compensation is founded.
TIMOTHY J. PARIS

